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IN THE SUPREME OOURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P la in t i f f -Responden t , 
- v s . -
ELBERT JUNIOR ROSS, 
Defendant-Appel lant . 
Case No. 1^560 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The a p p e l l a n t , E l b e r t Junior Ross, was convicted in the 
Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, in and for Weber County, S t a t e of 
Utah, of the crime of D i s t r i b u t i o n of a Controlled Substance for 
Value in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Annotated, 58-37-8 (1953) ' The 
Honorable John F . Wahlquist, Judge, p r e s i d e d . From the judgment of 
convic t ion the defendant br ings t h i s d i r e c t appealI 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury impaneled in the matter found the defendant guilty 
of the crime of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value. 
Subsequently, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve an in-
determinate sentence in the Utah State Prison of ftom one to fifteen 
years as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the verdict and judgment of 
the trial court and remand of this matter for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 8, 1975* at approximately 11:12 a.m., Ken 
Goode and Charlene Goode, undercover narcotics operatives for the 
Ogden City Police, went to a residence located at 804 West 27th 
Street, Ogden, Utah, for the purpose of making a "controlled buy" 
of Heroin. (Tr. 5,19,83). 
Upon trial in this matter, the only testimonial evidence 
offered by the prosecution with respect to the events that sub-
sequently transpired within the above residence was the testimony 
of Ken and Gharlene Goode. Said testimony was to the effect that, 
upon entering said residence, they encountered the appellant and 
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requested of him that he s e l l them some Heroin* According to the 
Goodes, the defendant-appellant, Elbert Ross, then sold them three 
"balloons** of a substance l a t e r identif ied as Heroin for $75*00* 
No one other than the Goodes observed the alleged transaction nor 
the defendant* The Goocfe; then proceeded to inject the heroin from 
two of the balloons into the i r veins . One halloa* was allegedly 
secreted and subsequently delivered to the authori t ies* (Tr* 4-5, 
59,88-89) • None of the "buy money** was ever recovered from defendant-
appellant* 
Prom the testimony of the Goods, and the testimony of other 
witnesses called a t t r i a l herein, i t was established that : 
1* Mr* Goode was a twice convicted felon (Tr* 50-51) and 
Mrs* Goode had also been previously convicted of a Felony (Forgery) 
(Tr. 83) . 
2. Both Mr* and Mrs.Goode were "former** Heroin addicts 
who were, a t the time of the alleged buy, under the auspices of a 
federally financed Methadone Maintenance program* (Tr* 90)* 
3* Both the Goode's had recently been changed with new 
felony charges of Possession with Intent to Distr ibute for Value and 
Receiving Stolen Property ar is ing out of the burglary of a drug store 
located a t Washington Terrace, Utah. (Tr. 51,68-69•84). 
4. Mrs* Goode was a?, admitted former p ros t i t u t e . (Tr. 92). 
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5« Both Goodes had, on the occasion of the alleged 
"buy", injected Heroin into the i r veins* (Tr. 4-5# 59> 88-
89). 
6* Ken Goode was a major "dealer" in narcotic drugs. 
(Tr. 112). 
7« Both Goodes were test i fying in this and rela ted 
matters in expectation of some substant ia l consideration from 
the State of Utah. (Tr. 67,77-80,9^). 
8. Both Goodes invoked their pr ivi lege of self-
incrimination during t r i a l . (Tr. 70,93)• 
Upon t r i a l in the matter, subsequent to both par t ies 
res t ing thei r respective cases, the jury retired, to consider 
a Verdict. Upon del iberat ion, the jury returned a verdict 
against appellant of Guilty of Distribution for Value of a 
Controlled Substance, and judgment and sentence were duly 
entered by the t r i a l court accordingly. (Tr. 138, R» 81)• 
Prom that judgment and verdict the defendant-appellant brings 
th is d i rec t appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IN THIS MATTER WAS 
LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
I t i s well establ ished as a matter of law that , in a criminal 
prosecut ion the State must e s tab l i sh beyond a l l reasonable doubt a l l 
of the elements of the offense charged, and that in the absence of such 
degree of proof the defendant i s e n t i t l e d to acquittal* Holt Vi 
United S ta tes , 218 U.S. 2^5* 5^ L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct. 2 ( ) ; 
State v* Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, ^ 9 P« 2d 269 (1972); State v . 
Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P* 2d 711 (1955); State v . Sul l ivan, 6 Utah 
2d 110, 307 P. 2d 212 (1957); State v . Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 
P. 2d 146 ( i 9 6 0 ) . I t i s further well established that the Supreme 
Court, in reviewing the l ega l su f f i c i en tcy of the evidence submitted 
to the t r i e r of f a c t , may s e t aside a verdic t of g u i l t y where the 
evidence was so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that reasonable men 
could and should have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime charged. (State v . Allgood, supra; State v . 
Shonka, supra; State v . Sul l ivan, supra; State v> Danks, supra.) 
In State v . Sul l ivan , supra, Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking 
for the Court, enunciated f u l l y the above standard: 
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The presumption of innocence and the 
requirement of proof of guilt beyond any 
reasonable doubt, are indeed of the utmost 
importance as safeguards against the poss-
ibility of convicting the innocent. Me 
scrupulously adhere to them notwithstanding 
the difficulties encountered and the poss-
ibility that some guilty may escape pun-
ishment* It is an ancient and honored 
adage of our law that it is better that ten 
guilty go free than that one innocent per-
son be punished• We appreciate the wisdom 
of that maxim and the importance of 
according every proper consideration to 
those accused of crime • • • 
Before a verdict may properly be set 
aside, it must appear that the evidence was 
so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds acting fairly upon it must 
have entertained reasonable doubt that de-
fendants committed the crime. Unless the 
evidence compels such conclusion as a 
matter of law, the verdict must stand. 
(6 Utah 2d pp. 113-114). 
Similaijy, in State v. Danks, supra, Mr» Justice Gallister 
wrote: 
Before setting aside a jury verdict it 
must appear that the evidence was so incon-
clusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable 
minds acting fairly upon it must have enter-
tained reasonable doubt that defendant committed 
the crime. (10 Utah at 164). 
Uiis court has also stated: 
If the Staters evidence is so inherently 
improbable as to be unworthy of belief, so that 
upon objective analysis it appears that rea-
sonable minds could not believe beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was guilty, the juryfs 
verdict cannot stand. Conversely, if the State's 
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evidence is such that reasonable minds could 
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was guilty, the verdict must be 
sustained. State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 
2^ 9 P. 2d 211 (1952). (See also State v. 
Home, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 P. 2d 109 (196l) 
for the same rule). 
Finally, in what appear to be some what variant 
statements of essentially the same principle enunciated in the above 
cited cases, this Court has said that a jury verdict of guilty 
may be set aside when "taking the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the verdict," the "findings are unreasonable." State v« 
Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P. 2d 183 (i960). Alternatively, if 
the verdict is "supported by sufficient competentevidence" a new 
trial is to be denied. State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95> 355 P* 2d 
689 (i960). See also State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255t ^70 P. 2d 246 
(1970) for the rule that there must be a "reasonable basis" for the 
verdict. 
It is apparent from these various statements of the law 
that this court do»& clearly have the power to reverse and remand in 
an appropriate case and to direct that a new trial be had. 
Ibis court has said that: 
We are not unmindful of the settled rule that 
it is the province of the jury to weigh the testi-
mony and determine the facts. Nevertheless, we 
cannot escape the responsibility of judgment upon 
whether under the evidence, a jury could, in reason, 
conclude that the defendant's guilt was proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 111 
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Utah 3?9, 180 P. 2d 551, S55 (19^7)• 
Applying the rationale of the above cited authorities 
to the facts in this case, it is clear that the evidence presented herein 
was not legally sufficient, upon the above enunciated "reasonable man stan-
dard "to warrant a convicticn and this Court could and should 
reverse the verdict and judgment of the trial court. 
As noted above, the State's case against Elbert Ross is 
founded, in most if not all particulars, upon the testimony of Ken 
and Charlene Goode. Only they purportedly witnessed the alleged 
,fbuyH and testified to same}and only they identified the defendant 
at trial. 
As regards the above witnesses it was clearly established at 
trial that: 
1. Mr. Goode was a twice concicted felon (Grand Larceny-
Possession) (Tr. 50-51) and Mrs. Goode had also been previously convicted 
of a Felony (Forgery) (Tr. 83). 
2. Both Mr* and Mrs. Goode were "former1* Heroin addicts 
who were, at the time of the alleged buy, under the auspices of a 
federally financed Methadone Maintenance program. (Tr. 90)• 
3» Both the Goodefs had recently been charged with new felony 
charges of Possession with Intent to Distribute for Value and Receiving 
Stolen Property arising out of the burglary of a drug store located 
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at Washington Terace, Utah. (Tr. 51*68-69,84). 
4. Mrs. Goode was an admitted former prostitute. (Tr. 
92). 
5» Both Goodes had, on the occasion of the alleged "buy4*., 
injected Heroin into their veins. (Tr. 4-5*59*88-89). 
6. Ken Goode was a major "dealer" in narcotic drugs. 
(Tr. 112). 
?• Both Goodes were testifying in this and related matters for 
some substantial consideration ftom the State of Utah. (Tr. 67, 
77-80,94). 
8. Both Goodes invoked their privilege of self-incrimination 
during trial. (Tr. 70, 93)• 
Prom the above, it should be abundently clear that the 
Goodes were clearly, as noted in the prosecutorfs unintentional 
pun made in his opening statement herein, "not very good people." 
And, although they were indisputedly competent witnesses under our 
law (See in this regard Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-24-1 (1953) )J 
their testimony was thoroughly and clearly impeached and unworthy of 
belief. No "reasonable man", upon the standard above cited, could con-
vict the defendant, Elbert Ross, upon the testimony of such witnesses, 
particualrly in view of all impeaching matters brought to the juryfs 
attention. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ihe verdict of gui l ty in the instant case was clearly 
not supported by the believable evidence* This court should reverse 
the verdict and judgment of the t r ia l court and remand this matter 
for a new tr ial* 
Respectfully submlttea?j\ 
TOM JONESy
 x 
Attorney sor - Appellant 
263 South Second East 
-Sal^Lake City, Utah 84111 
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